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Economics takes an individualistic approach to human behaviour. This is reflected in the use of 
“contingent valuation” surveys to conduct cost benefit analysis for economic policy evaluation. An 
individual’s valuation of a policy is assumed to be unaffected by the burdens it places on others. We 
report a survey experiment to test this supposition in the context of climate change policy. Willingness 
to pay for climate change mitigation was higher when richer individuals were to bear higher costs than 
when, as is usual, no explicit information was provided about cost distribution. This result is 
inconsistent with the usual interpretation of contingent valuation data. It also suggests that the data 
may be biased indicators of policy acceptance. Additional survey questions suggest that a collective 
mode of reasoning is common. 
 
Keywords: contingent valuation, climate change mitigation, public opinion, methodological 
individualism 
 
1. Introduction: Individualism, Contingent Valuation and Policy Acceptance1 
Modern economics is committed to methodological individualism, the doctrine that society is always 
to be understood in terms of the individuals that comprise it (Boland, 1982; Udehn, 2002). This leads 
to a distinctive emphasis on the individual in much applied economic research and policy analysis 
(Adieh, 2011). We examine one manifestation of this emphasis of particular importance to 
environmental policy discourse, namely economic cost benefit analysis (CBA). Using CBA, a policy is 
evaluated by estimating how much money its prospective outcomes are worth to each individual 
member of the relevant population.  Individuals’ valuations are summed yielding a total value to be 
compared to the costs of the policy. A positive evaluation is returned only if total benefits exceed total 
costs. In that case, the policy is potentially “Pareto improving” or “efficient”, meaning that it would be 
possible for everyone to be better off under the policy. 
In many contexts, for CBA to be applied, monetary values need to be assigned to the outcomes 
under evaluation, despite the fact that they do not have market prices. This is generally the case for 
environmental policies. There is no price on clean air, for example, such that people are used to 
thinking about whether or not to pay for more of it. For this reason, “contingent valuation” (CV) is 
often used, in which a survey respondent is asked about a hypothetical transaction to acquire the 
environmental benefit. Whilst a policy might require collective action to achieve a goal, then, the CV 
scenario used to evaluate it essentially depicts an individual survey respondent exchanging some of 
their own money for the benefit.  
The individualism of CBA and the CV technique align with that of the broader economics 
discipline. Welfare economics, for example, aims to represent the welfare of society as a function of 
each individual’s welfare (Sen, 1973). Further, the welfare of an individual is generally represented 
only as a function of her desired consumption outcomes, rather than outcomes for others. 
Interdependencies in preferences or welfare, whilst studied as interesting technical cases by economic 
 
1 Declaration of interests: none. The authors would like to acknowledge funding from the Leverhulme Trust, 
grant RPG-2014-404, and audiences at the University of Oslo, the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the 
University of Reading for valuable comments. 
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theorists (for example, Pollack, 1976; Bergstrom 1989; Ley 1997), are generally not considered as 
central cases or investigated in routine applied work. 
Welfare-relevant outcomes have been broadly conceptualised by environmental economists, 
to include desiderata such as the existence of polar bears or the integrity of the Arctic ice cap. But CV 
follows the general practice of excluding distributional matters from valuations, that is, how much 
different sections of society stand to gain or lose (Carson and Haneman, 2005 section 3, Bockstael and 
Freeman 2005, section 2). This is despite the fact that securing environmental outcomes would involve 
mass cooperation, and so a broad dispersion of costs. Such dispersion raises important equity and 
equality issues. These are particularly marked in the case of climate change policy, partly because of 
unequal distribution of consumption-based emissions across households (Brand and Boardman, 2008; 
Bardsley et al., 2017; Gough, 2017).  
In so far as distributional concerns are recognised then, the working assumption is that they 
are separable from environmental valuation. This assumption contributes crucially to the analytical 
power of CBA, for the questions of whether a policy is socially desirable and how to implement it can 
then be considered separately. However, this separate treatment seems justifiable only if the working 
assumption is empirically correct. Investigation of this matter is the central focus of this paper. 
Proponents of “deliberative valuation” (see O’Neill and Spash, 2000, Spash 2008b, and Vargas et al. 
2017 for recent critical discussion) have argued that evaluative attitudes relevant to policy are not 
simply preferences on a consumer choice model. Rather they are judgements about what is right, and 
so subject to ethical deliberation, such that environmental valuation ought not to strip out equity 
considerations. If so, one would expect stated WTP values to be sensitive to cost shares, and this result 
would provide additional impetus to use and refinement of alternative methods to inform policy. 
A large literature exists on CV, including a set of significant controversies – see for example 
Oerlemans et al. (2016), Hausman (2012), World Bank (2012), Venkatachalam (2004), and Diamond 
and Hausman (1994). One concern is whether the elicited values represent pre-existing dispositions 
or are purely reactions to the survey instruments. Another is whether assigning monetary values to 
ecosystems is consistent with perceived ethical duties to protect them. Despite strong criticism, 
however, monetary valuation methods including CV are resurgent with the advent of the “ecosystem 
services” paradigm, (Spash and Aslaksen, 2015; Spash, 2008a). We believe new critical scrutiny is 
therefore timely. An important partial defence of CV is that the numbers collated may be meaningful 
even if one rejects the economic framework the technique is derived from. This may have been first 
articulated by Naess (1989), who rejects the economic interpretation of CV data as direct measures of 
the value of a policy on philosophical grounds, but also argues that CV is of value as opinion research. 
In the context of climate policy, CV data might be interpreted as information about policy acceptance. 
But such a position raises questions about the quality of the data, so interpreted. Sensitivity of WTP 
to cost shares could also bias CV under this broader interpretation. 
The individualism of CV seems not to have been subject to close empirical scrutiny. We focus 
on climate change policy for this both because of its topicality in the wake of the Paris agreement, and 
because it impacts on the whole population, rendering the exclusion of distributional concerns 
particularly problematic. For a review of 27 studies estimating WTP for climate change mitigation, see 
Johnson and Nemet (2010). The review finds huge variation in participants’ mean WTP, ranging from 
$22 to $2623 per household across studies (in 2008 dollars), partly reflecting diversity in policy 
scenarios, and so variation in the marginal changes to public good supplied. The studies generally 
employed CV, and did not inform respondents about distributional aspects of policies, other than an 
implicit “flat rate”. A flat rate policy is one where everyone simply pays the same amount, and would 
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cost poorer people more as a proportion of income. Cai et al. (2010) report that WTP for climate 
change mitigation is sensitive to the distribution of burdens between countries, and to shares of 
different policy instruments within a country. They interpret this as showing sensitivity of WTP to 
distributional concerns between rich and poor, but other factors such as the perceived effectiveness 
of different international burden divisions or policy instruments might also account for these results. 
In contrast, we report a survey experiment testing the sensitivity of CV responses to others’ policy 
obligations, ceteris paribus. Cai et al. (2010) is the only CV study we have found to consider 
distributional concerns in this sense, whilst CV respondents’ responsibility for the environmental 
problem, a different dimension of fairness, has been studied by Ajzen et al. (2000).  
We note that effects of prospective cost shares would be open to interpretation. An important 
possibility has been raised within economics itself. A disposition to reason collectively, “team 
reasoning”, has been posited by certain game theorists, to account for some of the observed 
phenomena of human cooperation (Sugden, 1993; Bacharach, 1997) and is a promising interpretation 
of data from relevant behavioural games (Bardsley et al., 2010). Under team reasoning, individuals 
ask themselves not “What should I do?” when making a decision, but “What should we do?”, acting 
on considerations of which sets of actions are best for a group or society. This seems close to the 
vernacular concept of “doing one’s bit”, and the “we” perspective posited by Vatn (2009). It has been 
conceptualised in terms of plans with different parts for different members, with ideal characteristics 
of causal appropriateness to achieve the goal in question and equity between members (Bacharach, 
2006). We hypothesise that many respondents are disposed to team reason when evaluating policy, 
and therefore that the distribution of costs over other members of society matters. Such a disposition 
would impact fundamentally on economic theory. To investigate this possibility, we incorporate post-
CV survey questions designed to probe motivation directly. 
Our design and procedures are described in detail in the next two sections. We compare CV 
responses in two treatments. In the standard “no profile” treatment, no explicit information is given 
about others’ obligations under the climate change mitigation policy. Without this it is natural for 
them to interpret the policy cost as a flat rate. In the “profile” treatment, respondents are told that 
richer sections of the population will pay more, and are shown an indicative schedule of incomes and 
payments. Other aspects of the scenario, including how much the sampled individuals would have to 
pay, are held equal across the treatments.  
 
2. A Survey Experiment on Contingent Valuation: Study Design  
The survey questions were organised in 4 parts. Part 1 asked for participants’ demographic 
information. Part 2 contained questions about climate change and climate change policy. Part 3 
introduced the CV scenario and elicited WTP. In Part 4 questions explored respondents’ experience 
with and reasoning in answering the CV questions. It also presented four different payment 
distributions and asked participants which of these four they would vote for. Materials are available 
on request. 
The questionnaires of the two treatments had identical parts 1, 2 and 4. The design of part 3 
was driven by the objective to assess the effect of information about what others have to pay, “profile 
information”, on contingent valuations. The aim was not primarily to assess the actual willingness-to-
pay. Part 3 used both a binary (yes/no) and a maximum WTP format to ascertain the effect of the 
profile information. Our main hypothesis is that WTP is higher in the profile treatment, to be assessed 
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using standard non-parametric tests: a chi-square test of independence for the binary data, and 2-
tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test for the maximum WTP data.  
During the early days of contingent valuation studies, open questions of the type “What is the 
maximum you would be willing to pay for ____?” were used to elicit the willingness-to-pay (Aizaki et 
al., 2015).  Closed format questions were suggested by Bishop and Heberlein (1979) and endorsed by 
Arrow et al.’s (1993) report for the NOAA. This format asks respondents if they would be willing to pay 
a specific amount Y for the outcome in question. The closed format is regarded as much easier for 
respondents to answer. It is perhaps most commonly framed as a referendum question in policy 
research, with participants asked if they would vote for the policy proposal or not. We did not adopt 
the referendum framing because of the inclusion of the open Maximum WTP question. This way we 
hold the framing constant across questions, but retain the simplicity of the closed format. Since closed 
questions have become the standard, we use this format first. To reduce potential anchoring effects, 
we separate the open format item with an additional question. This asks respondents to predict the 
percentage in favour of the policy. 
 The policy scenario was that, in the wake of the Paris agreement, a levy is proposed on 
taxpayers in order to reduce consumption and support the renewable energy sector. In the standard 
treatment, each participant was simply informed that she would have to pay £1000 per year. In the 
profile treatment, participants were informed that the contribution would depend on income. Those 
with incomes between £14,000 and £46000 would pay £1000, and those with higher incomes more. 
The information and questions for the CV questions are summarised in Table 1 below. In the profile 
treatment, the CV questions were followed up by asking whether their maximum WTP would require 




 No profile Profile 
Information Following the Paris Agreement, 
a levy is proposed on 
taxpayers, in order to both 
reduce consumption and 
support the renewable energy 
sector. You would have to pay 
£1000 per year. 
 
Following the Paris Agreement, a levy is 
proposed on taxpayers, in order to both 
reduce consumption and support the 
renewable energy sector. People with 
personal income between £14,000 and 
£46,000 would have to pay £1,000 per year. 
People with incomes above £46,000 would 
have to pay a higher levy. The table below 
gives examples of the levy for selected 
incomes: 
 













Would you be willing to pay this levy?    Yes □    No □  
What % of the population do you think would be in favour? _____ % 
What is the maximum levy you would be willing to pay? £_________ 
 
Table 1. Policy scenario by treatment and CV questions  
By selecting the sample according to income, we arranged that each participant would pay 
£1000 p.a. in both treatments, and by construction of the payment schedules, revenue was equalised 
across treatments. The need to equalise revenue across treatments meant that a truly progressive 
schedule, that is, with proportional payments increasing with income, could not be shown. The 
schedule is merely less regressive than the flat rate levy. £1000 p.a. is towards the high end of values 
reported in previous studies (Johnson and Nemet, 2010). Most studies, however, use samples 
including persons not in employment; we sample exclusively people in work. Renewable energy is also 
a relatively popular measure to specify as a destination for the revenue. We would therefore expect 
the typical willingness to pay to be higher than in a typical study. The payment schedules presented 
in part 4 were designed to raise the same overall totals. The calculations were based on the latest 
available UK income distribution figures (HMRC, 2016).  
 
3. Procedures 
The study was carried out at the University of Reading, UK, with 176 participants using pen and paper. 
Four sessions were run between June 20th and July 4th 2016, two for each treatment, resulting in 91 
completed questionnaires for the no profile treatment and 85 for the profile treatment. 
Participants were recruited through a consumer testing agency based at the University of 
Reading, using filters on employment and income. Those contacted who confirmed that they were 
employed and had income ranging between £14,000 and £46,000 were invited to take part.  
Participants were aged between 20 and 65 with an average age of 42 and the gender split was 49 
percent male and 51 percent female. 
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Upon arrival participants were allocated to seats which were laid out in a way to provide 
privacy when filling in the questionnaire. An introduction to the study was given orally and in writing, 
and participants were given time to read and ask questions. The introduction set out basic scientific 
information about climate change, and gave some details about the research project and its funding. 
Questions were answered by the researchers in private. Participants were then asked to complete the 
questionnaire, consisting of parts 1-4 as described above. After all participants had finished, they were 
paid £15 each in cash for taking part. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 CV questions 
CV question No profile Profile 
Significance,  
95% confidence interval 










Chisq(1) = 10.1; p < 0.01 (independence) 
4.3% < x < 36.4% (difference in proportions) 































Z = 1.05; p = 1.00 (Wilcoxon’s rank sum) 
-£73.00 < x < £307.86 (difference in means) 
 
Z = 2.88; p = 0.02 (Wilcoxon’s rank sum) 
£1.34 < x < £408.82 (difference in means) 
 
 
Chisq(1) = 4.1; p = 0.18 (independence) 
-2.7% < x < 23.6% (difference in proportions) 
Table 2. Results of CV survey questions by treatment 
Notes 
1. P-values and confidence intervals are Bonferroni-corrected: ‘p’ is multiplied by 4 and ‘α’ by ¼. 
2. Bootstrap confidence intervals were generated in STATA using the normal approximation method, 
drawing 10,000 bootstrap samples. The normality assumption was confirmed using ‘probability 
normal’ and ‘quantile normal’ diagnostic plots. 
3. 3 observations were dropped as they reported a personal income below the payment threshold in the 
profile treatment. 





Figure 1. Distribution of positive willingness to pay values, by treatment 
Note 
Boxes show the median and interquartile range. Bars extend to the most extreme value up to 1.5 times the 
interquartile range below the 25th and above the 75th percentiles. 
 
4.2 Post-experimental Survey 
We asked respondents directly how they had made their CV decision, including an option representing 
team reasoning and an option representing CV type reasoning. Other options were taken from pilot 
interviews when subjects attempted to explain their responses. 52% of subjects chose the team 
reasoning option, compared to 27% choosing the CV option (Figure 2, upper panel). We also probed 
motivation less directly, testing whether respondents wished to offload their costs onto the rich 
(Figure 2, lower panel). The question holds constant the income that would be harvested from the 
levy under four different schedules of contribution (Methods section) and asks respondents which 
schedule they would vote for.  The proportion of the levy provided by richer sections of the population 
increases across schedules A to D. By construction of the sample using income restrictions each 
respondent would have to pay the same amount, £1000 per year, under schedules A, B and C, but 
none would have to pay under D. Only 40% of respondents selected the schedule under which they 
would pay nothing. Two questions were included to provide insight into respondent’s reasons for 
giving the responses they did. The question forms are shown in italics in Figure 2 below, with 
percentage responses. 
 
 5. Analysis and Discussion  
We observe a clear effect of providing progressive profile information, compared to the standard 
formulation where no information is given about others’ obligations. Acceptance of the policy, judged 
by survey question 1, was significantly higher in the profile treatment, apparently making a difference 
of just over 20 percentage points (Table 2). Results for maximum WTP, question 2, were directionally 
consistent with the results for question 1 but not statistically significant. Since positive and zero values 





Q4 From the list below, please indicate which of the following statements most closely 
reflects how you decided whether or not you would be willing to pay the levy: 
 % 
 To me, it does not matter how much other people contribute. 17 
 I am willing to do my part in the UK’s contribution to tackle 
climate change. 
52 
 I am not willing to pay anything because my contribution will 
not make a difference. 
10 
 I am not willing to pay anything because I do not believe that 
climate change policies are effective. 
10 
 I am willing to pay the amount that action on climate change 
is worth to me. 
27 
 
Q5 In order to collect the same overall amount of the levy different amounts, varying with 
income, can be used. The table below gives details of four possible distributions of charges 
all raising the same overall amount of money. The amounts given are the levy that a 
person at these income levels would have to pay per year. 
If you were asked to vote on the distributions, which one would you choose? 
A □   B □   C □   D □ 


















Income per year Levy per year 
£8,000 £1,000 £0 £0 £0 
£13,000 £1,000 £400 £0 £0 
£20,000 £1,000 £1,000 £1,000 £0 
£30,000 £1,000 £1,000 £1,000 £0 
£70,000 £1,000 £1,540 £1,000 £0 
£100,000 £1,000 £2,200 £2,700 £16,500 
£500,000 £1,000 £11,000 £38,700 £236,500 
£1,000,000 £1,000 £22,000 £83,700 £511,500 
% (2% DNA) 
% of Q1 WTP = Yes 


















significant test result.2 Comparison of zero values across treatments shows no significant difference in 
their incidence.3 Distribution plots for positive WTP values in each treatment are given in Figure 2, 
showing a £500 difference between the upper quartiles, and inter-quartile ranges that are largely 
distinct. 
The follow-up to the CV questions in the profile treatment confirmed that there is a 
relationship between valuation responses and parts to be played by others. For many subjects (55%) 
wished to condition their maximum payments on an altered schedule for others’ contributions. The 
general pattern of responses can be roughly characterised as wanting the richest to pay more. See 
Figure A1 (Appendix).  
Two conclusions follow from the effects observed. Firstly, the power of the economic CBA 
approach to environmental policy analysis is undercut, since a different sum of estimated benefits will 
obtain for each way of distributing the costs of a policy. Secondly, the standard implementation of this 
exercise is likely to bias acceptance in a negative direction. This is because without explicit profile 
information, respondents are likely to interpret the policy as one that applies to everyone equally. For 
our policy this implies a “flat rate” charge, with everyone in work paying £1000 regardless of their 
income. This would be to charge poorer persons more as a proportion of their incomes, a “regressive” 
policy. In contrast, realistic implementations of climate policies would have to counteract regressivity 
to ensure sufficient acceptance from the population.  
As noted in our introduction, economists have theorised about matters such as fairness or 
equity, but this has not influenced working assumptions in applied work. We have chosen not to reach 
automatically for such terms because of the vagueness of the natural language, and the problematic 
nature of economic models of unselfishness. Conceptualised as interdependent utility, non-selfish 
motivation becomes a public good, subject to the false comparative static predictions of the pure 
theory of public goods. For a review see Bardsley (2000). Thinking of the result in terms of TR avoids 
this problem. 
To probe TR empirically, we consider the results of two post-experimental survey, questions 
4 and 5, shown in Figure 2. Since it would be difficult to quantify team reasoning precisely using such 
questions, we first compared its apparent occurrence to that of CV type reasoning, and secondly 
probed respondents’ willingness to offload costs onto others. Question 4 asked directly how 
respondents had made their decision for their answer to question 1. We included items representing 
TR and CV reasoning, nested amongst three other responses which had occurred in pilot interviews. 
52% of subjects selected the team reasoning response (“I am willing to do my part in the UK’s 
contribution to tackle climate change”) verses 27% for the CV response (“I am willing to pay the 
amount that action on climate change is worth to me”). So judging by self-report, team reasoning was 
more prevalent than CV reasoning. 
Question 5 tests whether respondents wish simply to offload costs onto the rich.  This would 
be expected if our treatment effect is driven by a desire to see the rich penalised. The question holds 
constant the income that would be harvested from the levy under four different schedules of 
 
2 A more involved treatment, common in CV exercises, is to treat “protest zeros” separately from “true zeros”, 
with protests defined as objections to the policy rather than statements of no benefit (Strazzera et al., 2003). 
However, the distinction between protest and genuine zeroes is based on interpretations of survey responses, 
and often identifies few genuine zeroes for environmental policy. Given the global scope of climate change, it is 
hard to make sense of zeroes here other than as a form of protest response, including climate scepticism or 
pessimism concerning the feasibility of mitigation. 
3 Significance in Table 2 is not affected by use of Holm’s or Hochberg’s stepwise procedures, which are known 
to be less conservative than simple Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison. 
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contribution, A-D, and asks respondents which schedule they would vote for. The proportion of the 
levy provided by richer sections of the population increases across A to D. By construction of the 
sample using income restrictions, each respondent would have to pay the same amount, £1000 per 
year, under schedules A, B and C, but none would have to pay under D. A respondent who has no 
inherent desire to be a part of the policy but who prefers that richer persons pay more would therefore 
choose schedule D, offloading the entire cost of the policy onto high earners. Although D was the most 
frequent response, only 41% of respondents selected it, so 59% of respondents selected a schedule in 
which they themselves pay. Inspecting the data further, D is not the most popular choice amongst 
those who were willing to pay the levy, of whom only 18% chose it. On the other hand, it is also notable 
that the least popular schedule is the flat rate implementation, schedule A. Indeed, a negative 
association is evident between a schedule’s regressivity and the frequency with which respondents 
chose it. Thus, implementations in which richer people pay more seem more popular, though 
respondents generally seem to favour a broad distribution of responsibility which includes 
themselves.  
Further exploration of the data in Table 3 below offers some insight into the processes at 
work. We do not offer statistical tests for these comparisons as they were not pre-planned. Rather, 
we examine the pattern of responses to form plausible hypotheses. Firstly, our indicator of mode of 
reasoning does not seem to be associated with the inclusion of profile information, so it seems unlikely 
that the standard CV format is itself inducing individualism in respondents. The mode of reasoning 
indicator does appear to be associated with acceptance of the levy, however. A plausible mechanism 
behind our treatment effect, therefore, is that respondents are less likely to recognise the levy as 
“their part” in the UK’s contribution to climate change mitigation if others’ parts are not differentiated. 













Willing to do my part… 46 (51%) 45 (54%) 35 (87%) 56 (42%) 
Willing to pay the 
amount… worth to me 
23 (25%) 25 (30%) 8 (20%) 40 (30%) 
Table 3. Distribution of Reasoning Indicators by Treatment and Policy Acceptance 
Note 
Percentages in the third column sum to more than 100% because some respondents selected both answers for 
the reasoning indicator question. 
 
Finally, we conducted a probit regression analysis (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984) of willingness to pay the 
levy against independent variables from the survey. Policy acceptance (question 1, Table 1) was 
regressed on the treatment variable, demographic variables and responses to the questions on 
climate change. Results are shown in the form of a coefficient plot (Jann, 2013) in the Appendix (Figure 
A2). Again, we do not offer the regression analysis in the mode of hypothesis testing but that of 
hypothesis formation, using confidence intervals as rough indicators of plausible hypotheses. The 
results strengthen confidence in our interpretation of the main result, as the coefficient on the 
treatment variable suggests a large effect after controlling for other factors. This implies that there is 
nothing in the data suggesting an alternative explanation, for example via any chance imbalance of 
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attitudes across the sample. There also seems to be an association between policy acceptance and 
household, as opposed to personal, income, and, unsurprisingly, with perceptions that climate change 
is a threat to the respondent and their family. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We report a new problem for environmental CV in general, and its application to climate change policy 
in particular. Our CV survey experiment shows that respondents care not just about outcomes for 
themselves, but how those outcomes are produced in conjunction with others. Respondents’ social 
motivation can be rationalised either as wanting the rich to pay more, or team reasoning. The latter 
seems to be at least partly responsible, judging by our post-experimental survey. Certainly our results 
cannot be attributed to a simple desire to penalise the rich, since most respondents favoured an 
implementation of a climate change policy which they themselves would contribute towards. The 
individualism of CV seems therefore to be undermined at both a practical and a fundamental level. 
By showing sensitivity of reported CV responses to profile information, we are not thereby 
arguing for the incorporation of this information in future, in eliciting individuals’ monetary values for 
policies.4 Such a revised approach would imply a different CBA for each way of implementing a policy, 
undermining the analytical power of CBA. Rather, we are drawing attention empirically to the fact that 
CV is theory-bound in a way that is problematic in the face of human sociality. Further, if CV research 
is really to be interpreted as research on public opinion regarding potential policies, as Naess (1989) 
argued, it is important to realise that it is likely to be a biased instrument for such research. For climate 
change mitigation policy, it is likely that the bias operates in a negative direction, under-estimating 
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For you to be willing to pay the  
maximum levy, would it be necessary to  
change what other people have to pay? 
 Yes □    No □  
 
If yes, please indicate the changes in the 
levy that you would require: 
 















Income per year Mean (£) Median (£) 
£8,000 71 0 
£30,000 560 500 
£100,000 2619 2000 
£500,000 15,606 12,500 
£1,000,000 35,984 27,500 
 
 
Figure A1. Follow-up to the CV questions (left panel) and responses (right panel) to 1 s.f. 
Note. To calculate the distribution of responses, two observations were dropped where respondents had given 






Figure A2. Coefficient plot of probit regression model of policy acceptance (CV question 1)  
Notes.  
1. The probit regression model is specified as  𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 1|𝑋) =  Φ(𝑋𝑇𝛽), where Y is the dependent 
variable, acceptance of the levy, and X is a vector of covariates from the survey data plus a constant. 
The model was estimated using maximum likelihood in STATA. Marginal effects are shown for this 
model in Figure 3, defined as partial derivatives of Φ(𝑋𝑇𝛽) with respect to elements of X, calculated at 
the covariate values obtaining for each observation and averaged over the sample (“average marginal 
effects”). Coefficients are plotted as circles, and show marginal effects calculated at the mean values 
of the independent variables. 
2. Independent variables are as follows. Profile = treatment (binary), sex = male or female (binary), income 
= personal annual income (banded scale), household_income = household annual income (banded 
scale), class = social class, measured using the subjective Macarthur Scale (Operario et al., 2004), age = 
respondent’s age, children = number of children in the household. The remaining variables are Likert- 
scale variables measuring degree of belief in climate change, whether climate change is believed to be 
anthropogenic, believed to be proved, seen as a threat to the respondent and their family, seen as a 
threat to the UK, and seen as a threat to less developed countries, respectively. 
3. The non-binary variables were rescaled to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. 
4. N=121, because of item non-response. 
 
